Abstract This paper examines strict Nash networks in the noncooperative directed flow model of Bala and Goyal (Econometrica 68(5):1181-1230 with partner heterogeneity (payoff of a player in a link depends on the identity of her link partner). We focus on the asymmetries with regard to the resources obtained by players. Using the notion of condensation networks, we partition the population into groups of players who obtain the same resources and order these groups according to the resources they obtain. We show that the partner heterogeneity assumption impacts the strict Nash networks asymmetries in a different way than Galeotti (Econ Theory 29(1): [163][164][165][166][167][168][169][170][171][172][173][174][175][176][177][178][179] 2006) player heterogeneity assumption (the payoff of a player in a link depends on her own identity).
Introduction
In this paper, we follow the noncooperative approach to network formation initiated by Bala and Goyal (BG (2000) ). BG formulate network formation as a strategic game, where the addition and deletion of links are unilateral decisions. In their framework, a player can initiate a link to any other player, called the receiver. The initiator bears the costs of the link and the link enables resources to flow from the receiver to the initiator. In addition, the players gain access to resources from player(s) to whom they are linked through the receiver. There exist two versions of their model: in the directed flow version only the initiator of the link obtains resources through it, while in the undirected flow version both the initiator and the receiver of the link obtain resources through it. The networks corresponding to the strict Nash equilibria of such a game are called strict Nash networks.
Heterogeneity in this framework appears either in the form of players getting different benefits from each other and/or links between different players having different costs. The partner heterogeneity framework allows costs and values to depend on the identity of the receiver of the link, while the player heterogeneity framework allows costs and values to depend on the identity of the link initiator. Galeotti (2006) shows that player heterogeneity tends to increase the set of strict Nash networks in the directed version of the BG model. Billand et al. (2011) establish that this is true under partner heterogeneity in the undirected version of the BG model. As a result, we can expect that the characterization of the architecture of strict Nash networks can be quite complicated when partner heterogeneity is introduced in the directed version of the BG model. In this paper, rather than characterize the architectures of strict Nash networks as in the rest of the network formation literature, we focus on asymmetries among players (with regard to the resources they obtain) in strict Nash networks using the notion of condensation networks. Condensation networks induced by strict Nash networks allow us to partition players into groups, where players who belong to the same group obtain the same amount of resources from the network.
This partitioning of players has already been used by Kim and Wong (2007) to facilitate the characterization of the architectures of equilibrium networks. By contrast, in this paper, the partition of players is used to characterize the asymmetries that arise among players. More precisely, condensation networks allow us to characterize the resource flow between groups of players who obtain the same resources. So, condensation networks highlight asymmetries among players with regard to the resources they obtain in a very succinct manner. Condensation networks could be used in other contexts where asymmetry between players is an important feature. Consequently, our analysis of the noncooperative model of network formation with partner heterogeneity can be viewed as an illustration of our methodology.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2, we introduce the model setup and the definitions used in the paper. In Sect. 3, we present the results under partner value heterogeneity with homogeneous costs. In Sect. 4, we deal with partner value and costs heterogeneity. In Sect. 5, we compare the results obtained in the partner heterogeneity framework with the results obtained by Galeotti (2006) in the player heterogeneity framework.
Networks definitions A network g is an ordered pair of disjoint sets (V, A) such that A is a subset of the set V × V of ordered pairs of V . The set V is the set of vertices and A is the set of arcs. Let G be the set of directed networks. If g is a directed network, then V = V (g) is the vertex set of g, and A = A(g) is the arc set. An arc directed from vertex i to j is denoted by i j ∈ A(g). If there is an arc from i
be the set of arcs directed from i to another vertex. For a directed network, g, a path P i, j (g) in g from (the initial) vertex i to (the terminal) vertex j is an alternating sequence of vertices and arcs:
A cycle is obtained from a path by adding an arc from the terminal vertex to the initial vertex.
We say that g is a sub-network
The empty network, g e , is a network which contains no arc between distinct vertices. The network g is a tail star if the set of vertices can be partitioned into two groups, N 1 = {1, . . . , k} and N 2 = {k +1, . . . , n}, such that for all vertices i ∈ N 1 , we have i +1 i ∈ A(g), and i j ∈ A(g) otherwise, and for all vertices i ∈ N 2 , we have i k ∈ A(g), and i j ∈ A(g) for all j = k. A line network g is a tail star where N 2 = ∅. A center sponsored star is a network where there is an arc from a vertex i 0 to all vertices j = i 0 and there are no other arcs. Two networks g and g are isomorphic if they have the same number p of vertices and if we can order their vertices respectively i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i p and j 1 , j 2 , . . . , j p so that for any k and , arc i k i is in A(g) iff arc j k j is in A(g ).
We now present the notion of condensation network given by (HNC, HNC (1965) ). Let F : 2 V (g) → {1, . . . , 2 n } be a one to one mapping. F maps any subset of the set of vertices of g to a number. The network g is a condensation network induced by the directed network g if the set of vertices satisfies Property 1 and the set of arcs satisfies Property 2.
there is a path from any i ∈ X to any j ∈ X in g and (ii) there is no Y, Y ⊃ X such that there is a path from any i ∈ Y to any j ∈ Y in g.
There is an arc from F(X ) to F(Y ) iff there exist vertices i ∈ X and j ∈ Y such that there is an arc from i to j in A(g).
These properties imply that the set of vertices of the condensation network g is constructed by using the components of g to partition the set of vertices V(g). Moreover, we know from HNC (HNC (1965), Theorem 3.2, p. 55) that every vertex in V (g) is contained in exactly one component and each arc in A(g) is contained in at most one component.
We now provide an example of a condensation network g . Let V (g) = {1, . . . , 7} be the set of vertices of g and the arcs of g be drawn in Fig. 1a . Then, the condensation network is drawn in Fig. 1b . We observe that vertices 1, 2, 4, and 6 are in the same component in g, consequently they are associated with the same vertex in g . We set F({1, 2, 4, 6}) = 9. Similarly, F({5, 7}) = 10 and F({3}) = 8 in g . Finally, Property 2 implies that there is an arc from 10 to 8, from 10 to 9 and from 9 to 8 in g . It follows that the architecture of the condensation network is simpler than the architecture of the initial network.
Players and strategies Let N = {1, . . . , n} be the set of players. For the original network g, V (g) = N . Let G i = {i j | j ∈ N \ {i}} be the set of arcs that player i can form with other players. Each player i ∈ N chooses a strategy which consists in forming arcs:
, then i has formed an arc with j in g, otherwise i has not formed an arc with j. We focus only on pure strategies. The set of arcs between distinct players of the network g is
Payoffs An arc i j that player i forms with player j allows i to get resources from j. The converse does not hold, i j does not allow j to obtain resources from i. Also, player i obtains resources from other players not only through their direct arcs, but also via paths to other players.
Let N i (A(g)) = { j ∈ N | there is a path from i to j in the network (N , A(g))} be the set of players from whom i accesses resources. By construction, for each
In the partner heterogeneity model, each player i obtains the same resources from j, v j > 0, when j ∈ N i (g). The formation of an arc with player j also implies a cost c j > 0 for all players i ∈ N \ { j}. A player obtains her own resources even if she forms no arcs, i.e., there is no network, and we do not take into account the resources that each player i obtains from herself in her payoff function. To facilitate the comparison between the partner heterogeneity framework and the player heterogeneity framework of Galeotti (2006), we use the following linear payoff function, 1
(1)
Strict Nash networks The strategy A i (g) is said to be a strict best response of player i against the strategy A −i (g) if:
The set of all of player i's strict best responses to
A network g is said to be a strict Nash network if
Since c j > 0, in a strict Nash network g, i does not form an arc with j if she obtains the resources of j in the network g with A(g ) = A(g) − i j. We call this property the basic property of strict Nash networks (BPSN). The BPSN implies that there is at most one arc between two vertices of a condensation network associated with a strict Nash network. In the following, the condensation networks associated with strict Nash networks are called sN-condensation networks. Let G s N be the set of condensation networks induced by non-empty strict Nash networks.
Orderings We define g as the following binary relation on V (g): x g y iff there is a path from vertex x to vertex y in g. In particular, this definition implies
In that case, i g j means that i obtains resources from j, and i g j means that i does not obtain resources from
, if x g y and y g x imply x = y for all x, y ∈ V (g); transitive if x g y and y g z imply x g z for all x, y, z ∈ V (g). By the construction of N i (g), g is reflexive and transitive over N in g. A relation that is reflexive, symmetric, and transitive is an equivalence relation. An equivalence relation specifies how to partition a set into subsets called equivalence classes. A partially ordered set (V (g), g ) is a set V (g) on which there is a relation g that is reflexive, antisymmetric, and transitive. A partially ordered set (V (g), g ) is a chain if g is total. A Hasse diagram is a graphical representation of a partially ordered set. Suppose that (V (g), g ) is a partially ordered set and X ⊆ V (g). If x ∈ V (g) and y g x for each y ∈ X , then x is a lower bound for X . If the set of lower bounds of X has a greatest element, then this greatest lower bound of X is the infimum of X . If two elements x and y, of a partially ordered set V (g), have a greatest lower bound, then it is their meet x ∧ y. A partially ordered set
A source of an acyclic network g does not form any arc. 2 Each vertex of g is an equivalence class of g over N , hence the condensation network highlights the set of players who obtain the same resources.
Partner heterogeneous values and homogeneous costs
In this section, we assume that the payoff function of each player i satisfies (1) with c j = c for all j ∈ N , and use || for the cardinality of a set.
Proposition 1 If g is a non-empty strict Nash network, then |V
Proof Let g be a non-empty strict Nash network. To introduce a contradiction suppose |V (g )| ∈ {2, . . . , n − 1}. Given that |V (g)| = n there are two possibilities to obtain such a result. Either there exist F(X ) and F(Y ) in V (g ) such that X, Y ∈ 2 N and both |X |, |Y | > 1, or there exists F(X ) in V (g ) such that X ∈ 2 N and n > |X | > 1, and for all F(Y ) in V (g ) \ {F(X )}, we have |Y | = 1. We deal successively with these two possibilities. (i) Assume wlog that there is a path from
It follows that there is a path from k to j, with k ∈ N \ Y . Consequently, there are players j and k such that k j ∈ A(g)
In g , j incurs the same costs as in g since she forms the same number of arcs, and obtains more resources since by construction N i (g ) ⊃ N j (g). It follows that g is not a strict Nash network, a contradiction. (ii) Assume that there is no path between F(X ) and F(Y ). By assumption, there are i, i ∈ X such that i i ∈ A(g) (respectively j, j ∈ Y such that j j ∈ A(g)). We show that g is not a strict Nash network. To introduce a contradiction suppose g is a strict Nash network.
which is strictly negative since g is a strict Nash network. Suppose j ∈ N chooses strategy E j = A j (g) − j j + ji. Then,
which is strictly negative since g is a strict Nash network. By summing Eqs. (3) and (4) we obtain:
There are three possibilities.
(i) There is a path from F(Y ) to F(X ) in g . In such a case, there are players i, i ∈ X and j ∈ N \ X such that i i and j i belong to A(g). By partner value heterogeneity and costs homogeneity, j ∈ N \ X obtains the same payoff if she replaces her arc with i by an arc with i . Therefore, g is not a strict Nash network. (ii) There is a path from
there are players i and i in X such that i i ∈ A(g). Since there is a path from F(X ) to F(Y ), either player i or player i has formed an arc with a player j ∈ X in g. Suppose wlog that i has formed an arc with j in g. Then, there is no path, in the network associated with
that is j obtains more resources from i than i and incurs the same costs when she forms the arc j i . Consequently, g is not a strict Nash network, a contradiction. (iii) There is no path between F(X ) and F(Y ) in g . Then, we can use the same argument as in 1.(ii) above.
We now recall two results from directed graph theory useful for Proposition 2.
Theorem 1 (HNC (1965), Theorem 3.7, p. 63) The following statements are equivalent for any directed network g. (1) g is acyclic, that is, g has no cycles, (2) g and g have the same number of vertices, (3) g and g are isomorphic.

Theorem 2 (HNC (1965), Theorem 3.9, p. 65) The following statements are equivalent for any directed network g. (1) There is a path from i to j, for any players i and j in g, (2) g consists of exactly one vertex.
Note that, by Theorem 1, if |V (g )| = n, then g and g are isomorphic.
Proposition 2 Let g be a non-empty strict Nash network. If |V (g )| = 1, then g is an equivalence relation over N . If |V (g )| = n, then (N , g ) is a chain.
Proof Let g be a non-empty strict Nash network. Recall that, by construction, g is reflexive and transitive over N .
1. Suppose |V (g )| = 1. We show that g is symmetric. By Theorem 2, for all i, j ∈ N , we have i g j and j g i. 2. Suppose |V (g )| = n. We show that g is antisymmetric and total over N . Networks g and g have the same number of vertices: n. By Theorem 1, g is acyclic.
Consequently, g is antisymmetric over N . We now show that g is total over N , i.e., either
First, since g is an acyclic non-empty strict Nash network, there are players i, j ∈ N such that i j ∈ A(g) and N j (A(g)) = { j}. If i j ∈ A(g), then each player k such that j ∈ N k (A(g)) has an incentive to form an arc with player j in g.
by partner heterogeneity of values and homogeneity of costs. It follows that
Second, suppose that there are 3 distinct players i, j, k such that i j, k j ∈ A(g), then i has an incentive to form an arc with k instead of j since v k > 0 for all k ∈ N . Since there is a player i such that i ∈ N j (A(g)) for all j ∈ N and each player i has at most one predecessor, we obtain that g is total over N by using induction.
By Proposition 2, we know that if |V (g )| = n, then g is a chain over N . It follows that g is a line network as the Hasse diagram of a chain. By Theorem 2, g and g are isomorphic. We sum up these observations in the following corollary.
Corollary 1 Let g ∈ G s N . If |V (g )| = n, then g is a line network.
Taken together, Propositions 1, 2 and Corollary 1 show that in any strict Nash network, if costs are homogeneous and values are partner heterogeneous, then: either each player obtains the resources of all other players, or; each player obtains a unique amount of resources (given by her position in the line network).
Partner heterogeneous values and costs
In this section, we assume that the payoff function of each player i satisfies (1). In this setting, the architectures of strict Nash networks are much more complicated. Hence, the use of condensation networks allows us to to simplify the analysis. Next proposition highlights that there is at most one equivalence class with several players with regard to the set of resources that players obtain.
Proposition 3 Let g be the condensation network associated with a strict Nash network. If
Proof Let g be a sN-condensation network. To introduce a contradiction, suppose there are |X | > 1 and |Y | > 1, such that F(X ) ∈ V (g ) and F(Y ) ∈ V (g ). There are two possibilities.
Suppose wlog that there is a path from F(X
We have j ∈ N i (g). It follows that there exists a player k ∈ N \ Y , such that there is a path from k to j. Consequently, there are players j and k in g such that k j ∈ A(g) with k ∈ N \ Y and j ∈ Y . Moreover, since j ∈ Y, F(Y ) ∈ V (g ), and
and |X | > 1, there exist players i and i in X such that i i ∈ A(g). Let g be the network where A(g ) = A(g) + j 0 i − j 0 j and let g be the network where (A(g ) ) the last two inequalities cannot simultaneously hold. Consequently, g is not a strict Nash network. 2. Second, suppose that there is no path between F(X ) and F(Y ) in g . Since |X |, |Y | > 1 and F(X ), F(Y ) ∈ V (g ), there are players i, i ∈ X and j, j ∈ Y such that i i ∈ A(g) and j j ∈ A(g). However, by the same type of argument as in Proposition 1 1.(ii) if player i does not have any incentive to replace the arc i i by the arc i j , then player j always has an incentive to replace the arc j j by the arc j i . Consequently, g is not a strict Nash network.
Let us provide a useful result of graph theory for Proposition 4.
Theorem 3 (HNC (1965), Theorem 3.6, p. 63) The condensation network g of any directed network g is acyclic.
} be the set of greatest elements of (V (g ), g ). We use two lemmas given in the Appendix to establish Proposition 4. The first one shows that a sN-condensation network has a unique source. The second one establishes that in a sN-condensation network, if a vertex i receives two arcs from j and k, then j and k receive no arc from another vertex.
Proposition 4
Let g be a non-empty strict Nash network. Then,
Proof Let g be a non-empty strict Nash network. Let g be its condensation network. We prove successively the two parts of the Proposition. To avoid trivialities, we assume that |V (g )| ≥ 3. 3
1. First, we show that g is a partial order over V (g ). We know that g is transitive and reflexive. By Theorem 3, g is acyclic. Consequently, g is antisymmetric over V (g ). Thus, g is a partial order. Second, we show that for all
) is an inf-semi-lattice. We now show that if F(X ) ∈ V (g ) is not the minimal element of (V (g ), g ), then |X | = 1. To introduce a contradiction, suppose that F(X ) ∈ V (g ) is not the lower bound over V (g ) and |X | > 1. Since F(X ) is not the minimal element and (V (g ), g ) is an inf-semi-lattice, there exists a vertex
there are players i ∈ X and j ∈ Y such that i j ∈ A(g). wlog, assume that i = i. Since g is acyclic, j does not obtain the resources of players in X . If player j forms an arc with i , then she obtains resources at least equal to the resources obtained by i due to the arc i i and incurs the same costs as i. It follows that j has an incentive to form the arc j i since i has an incentive to maintain an arc with i in g. Therefore, g is not a strict Nash network, a contradiction.
) is a partial order. We show that g is total over
) is a finite inf-semi-lattice there is a vertex
Consequently, the assumptions of Lemma 2 are satisfied. It follows that g ∈ G s N , a contradiction. Second, we establish that for all
) is a chain, it contains a maximal element. Moreover, by Lemma 1, there exists a vertex
have formed an arc with the same vertex
) is a chain, we can assume wlog that
Consequently, the assumptions of Lemma 2 are satisfied. It follows that g ∈ G s N , a contradiction.
Part 1 of Proposition 4 provides two insights. First, there exist situations such that there are several players whose resources are not accessed by others, and there is a set of players whose resources are accessed by all others. Second, if several players belong to the same equivalence class with regard to the set of resources obtained, then they do not obtain resources from players who do not belong to this class.
Part 2 of Proposition 4 highlights the existence of two sets of players: players who belong to the set M(g ) are such that each obtains the resources of all other players, but no player in the population accesses their resources, and players who belong to the set N \ M(g ) are such that each of them has a predecessor.
Moreover, Proposition 4 implies the following result.
Corollary 2 Suppose g ∈ G Sn . Then, g is a tail star.
Furthermore, if a sN-condensation network contains 1 vertex, then it is empty. We illustrate by example a situation where the sN-condensation networks are tail stars.
Example 1 Suppose N = {1, 2, 3, 4}. Let v 1 = v 2 = 10, v 3 = v 4 = 4, c 1 = c 2 = 15, c 3 = 1, and c 4 = 2. Suppose F({1}) = 1, F({2}) = 2 and F({3, 4}) = 5. Straightforward calculations show that g such that A(g ) = {1 5, 2 5} belongs to G s N .
Discussion
First, we compare our results with those obtained by Galeotti ((2006) , Proposition 3.1, p. 169), for the player heterogeneity framework, using condensation networks. In the player heterogeneity framework, non-empty sN-condensation networks have x, x ∈ {1, . . . , n}, vertices and are either empty, or center sponsored stars. Hence, in a non-empty strict Nash network there exists a group of players who obtains the resources of all other players while other groups of players only obtain their own resources. Consequently, in the player heterogeneity framework there is a dichotomy with regard to the resources obtained by players. In the partner heterogeneity framework, there exist some intermediate groups of players who both obtain and provide resources to others. Moreover, results obtained in the player heterogeneity framework are valid regardless of whether costs are homogeneous or depend on the player initiating the arc. In the partner heterogeneity framework, however, non-empty sN-condensation networks are tail stars when costs are partner heterogeneous while they are line networks when the costs are homogeneous.
Second, we highlight the fact that condensation networks allow us to examine whether the incentives of individuals will lead them to form networks that are efficient from a social viewpoint, that is networks which maximize the sum of the utility of the players. More precisely, condensation networks allow us to see fairly clearly the divergence between the unilateral incentives of players to form arcs and the incentives of groups of players to form arcs. To illustrate this point, assume that there are two vertices F(X ), |X | > 1, and F(Y ) in the sN-condensation network g such that for all F(Z ) ∈ V (g ) \ {F(X )}, F(Z ) g F(Y ) and F(Y ) g F(Z ). Let i∈X j∈Y v j − min j∈Y {c j } be the maximal additional value obtained by F(X ) from F(Y ) when an arc is added between F(X ) and F(Y ) in g ; it is the maximal sum of the utility that the players who belong to X obtain if an arc is formed between their group and the group of players Y . Assume that j∈Y v j − min j∈Y {c j } < 0 and i∈X j∈Y v j − min j∈Y {c j } > 0. Since j∈Y v j − min j∈Y {c j } < 0, no player who belongs to X has an incentive to form an arc with a player who belongs to Y . Since i∈X j∈Y v j − min j∈Y {c j } > 0 the fact that a player who belongs to X forms an arc with player j, j ∈ arg min ∈Y {c }, improves the sum of the utility of the players who belong to X , and so the efficiency of the network.
Finally, in the partner heterogeneity framework, an efficient network is not always a strict Nash network. Indeed, in Example 1 network g such that A(g) = {1 2, 2 3, 3 4, 4 1} is efficient, but it is not a strict Nash network. Hence one can ask if it is possible to re-allocate the payoffs from a network among individual players to ensure that efficient networks are stable given each player's incentives to add or sever arcs. The answer to this question is in the affirmative based on Dutta and Jackson ((2000) , Theorem 5, p. 264) who establish that there exists an allocation rule for which at least one efficient network is an equilibrium in a general framework which contains the partner heterogeneity framework. 
